State v. Wilson: The Improper Use of Prosecutorial Discretion in Capital Punishment Cases by Daniel, Peter K.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 63 | Number 6 Article 12
8-1-1985
State v. Wilson: The Improper Use of Prosecutorial
Discretion in Capital Punishment Cases
Peter K. Daniel
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Peter K. Daniel, State v. Wilson: The Improper Use of Prosecutorial Discretion in Capital Punishment Cases, 63 N.C. L. Rev. 1136 (1985).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol63/iss6/12
State v. Wilson: The Improper Use of Prosecutorial Discretion
in Capital Punishment Cases
In State v. Wilson' the North Carolina Supreme Court held that a prosecu-
tor may consider the victim's family's feelings about the case when deciding
whether to seek the death penalty against an alleged murderer. A prosecutor's
decision to pursue capital punishment can be overturned only if he used an un-
justifiable standard such as "race, religion, or other arbitrary classification." '2
Absent abuse of prosecutorial discretion, the case may proceed toward a death
conviction.
The current status of capital punishment in the United States is founded on
the 1972 landmark case Furman v. Georgia.3 In Furman a majority of the
United States Supreme Court agreed that the death penalty constituted cruel
and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments. 4
As a result, virtually every existing capital punishment statute was invalidated.5
The death penalty, however, was not found unconstitutional per se; Furman
invalidated only those procedures that allowed capital punishment to be admin-
istered in an arbitrary or capricious manner. 6 Many of the statutes were rewrit-
ten, and in Gregg v. Georgia7 the Supreme Court approved a procedurally
modified capital punishment statute.8
In Gregg the Supreme Court expressly rejected the argument that arbitrary
capital convictions would result from prosecutorial discretion. 9 Nevertheless,
the procedural fairness mandated in the Furman opinions 10 conflicts with the
1. 311 N.C. 117, 316 S.E.2d 46 (1984).
2. Id. at 124, 316 S.E.2d at 51 (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962)).
3. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
4. Id. at 239-40 (per curiam). "The Court holds that the imposition and carrying out of the
death penalty in these cases constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments. The judgment in each case is therefore reversed insofar as it leaves undis-
turbed the death sentence imposed, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings." Id. All
nine justices expressed their views on capital punishment in separate opinions, but a majority of the
Court agreed that the Georgia capital punishment statute violated the eighth and fourteenth
amendments.
5. Id. at 417 & n.2 (Powell, J., dissenting). Forty states had capital punishment statutes; of
these, 39 were invalidated. Rhode Island's capital punishment statute imposed the death penalty for
murder committed by a life term prisoner; it was the only valid capital punishment statute after
Furman.
6. "Because of the uniqueness of the death penalty, Furman held that it could not be imposed
under sentencing procedures that created a substantial risk that it would be inflicted in an arbitrary
and capricious manner." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976).
7. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
8. Id. at 207. See also infra note 46 and accompanying text (the statute provided for separate
guilt and sentencing stages of the trial, required the finding of specific aggravating factors to impose
the death penalty, and made appeal automatic).
9. Id. at 199. See also infra note 47 and accompanying text (the statutory requirements in
Gregg pertained only to the sentencing authority).
10. The Court in Gregg read Furman to require only that capital punishment statutes include
sentencing guidelines that compel juries to consider the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of
the crime in deciding whether to impose the death penalty. The separate opinions in Furman, how-
ever, were more result oriented. The justices did not pinpoint certain stages of prosecution as prob-
lematic; they objected to the arbitrary and discriminatory results of capital punishment as it existed
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arbitrary and prejudicial effects that can occur if the prosecutor considers the
desire of the murder victim's family to seek the death penalty against the de-
fendant. Furthermore, Justice White, representing three concurring votes in
Gregg, noted, "Absent facts to the contrary, it cannot be assumed that prosecu-
tors will be motivated in their charging decision by factors other than the
strength of their case and the likelihood that a jury would impose the death
penalty if it convicts."1 1 State v. Wilson, however, presented a case in which the
prosecuting attorney was motivated by other than the legal considerations Jus-
tice White believed should be imputed to prosecutors.
On October 22, 1981, Luther R. Wilson, Jr. burglarized two Randolph
County homes. 12 Wilson broke into the first house and stole a gun, two
watches, and a small amount of money. In plain view of neighbors, he then
proceeded to the home of Leonard A. Teel, whose presence apparently surprised
Wilson. They may have fought. 13 In any event, Wilson was seen by the same
neighbors as he escaped with a ski mask pulled over his face and a "long gun in
his left hand."'14 The homeowner was not so lucky: dead or dying, Teel lay in
his house for two days until his body was discovered. Wilson was convicted of
armed robbery and first degree murder. The jury recommended that he be sen-
tenced to life imprisonment. 15
in 1972. Justice Douglas noted: "'A penalty. . . should be considered "unusually" imposed if it is
administered arbitrarily or discriminatorily.'" Furman, 408 U.S. at 249 (Douglas, J., concurring)
(quoting Goldberg & Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitutional, 83 HARV. L. REv.
1773, 1790 (1970)). Referring to the cruel and unusual punishment clause, Douglas held the eighth
amendment to "require legislatures to write penal laws that are even-handed, nonselective, and
nonarbitrary, and to require judges to see to it that general laws are not applied sparsely, selectively,
and spottily to unpopular groups." Id. at 256 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Brennan compared
the imposition of the death penalty to a lottery system. "When the punishment of death is inflicted
in a trivial number of the cases in which it is legally available, the conclusion is virtually inescapable
that it is being inflicted arbitrarily." Id. at 293 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Stewart concluded
that "the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death
under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed."
Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice White objected that "no meaningful basis [exists] for
distinguishing the few cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it
is not." Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring). Justice Marshall noted: "Regarding discrimination, it
has been said that '[lt is usually the poor, the illiterate, the underprivileged, the member of the
minority group-the man who, because he is without means, and is defended by a court-appointed
attorney-who becomes society's sacrificial lamb....'" Id. at 364 (Marshall, J., concurring)
(quoting Hearings on S. 1760 before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. ii (1968)). Justice Powell conceded that if a minority
could "demonstrate that members of his race were being singled out for more severe punishment
than others charged with the same offense,'a constitutional violation might be established." Id. at
449 (Powell, J., dissenting). Powell, however, rejected discrimination arguments as "hypothetical
assumptions that may or may not be realistic." Id. at 444 (Powell, J., dissenting).
11. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 225 (White, J., concurring).
12. Wilson, 311 N.C. at 120, 316 S.E.2d at 49.
13. Two witnesses testified that on different occasions defendant told them that he had broken
into a man's house with the intention of robbing him and subsequently had to kill him after the man
pointed a gun at him. Id. at 121, 316 S.E.2d at 49. An unexpected conflict between a defendant and
the victim may be considered by the jury as a mitigating circumstance in deciding whether to impose
the death penalty. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(f)(9) (1977).
14. Wilson, 311 N.C. at 120, 316 S.E.2d at 49.
15. Id. at 119, 316 S.E.2d at 48. "[The] jury found defendant guilty of robbery with a firearm,
guilty of murder in the first degree based upon the felony-murder rule, and not guilty of murder in
the first degree based upon premeditation and deliberation." Id.
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Wilson appealed, arguing that the trial judge erred by refusing to reduce the
crime charged to second degree murder. 16 The motion to reduce the crime had
been denied at a pre-trial hearing at which the defense attorney tried to establish
that most defendants charged with first degree murder in Randolph County had
been offered a chance to plead guilty to a lesser offense. 17 The prosecuting attor-
ney testified that he had not plea-bargained with the defendant because he had
consulted with the victim's family: "It's their feeling that they want to pursue
first degree murder. Only if the family wanted a plea to second degree murder
would it be possible for that plea to be entered." 18 The prosecuting attorney
added that he "always, if possible, consulted with the victim's family to consider
their feelings about the case."19
Wilson contended that his case was treated differently because Teel's family
wanted him to be tried for first degree murder. He argued that allowing the
family to decide whether a capital crime would be charged was an abuse of
prosecutorial discretion.20 The district attorney abdicated his responsibility and
delegated it to the victim's family, thus denying Wilson due process and equal
protection. 21 The North Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the decision to pros-
ecute for first degree murder and held that absent proof of discrimination the
prosecutor is presumed to have acted within legal bounds.22 The court con-
cluded that the "district attorney's consideration of the wishes of the family as
one factor in determining which defendant will be prosecuted for murder and
thereby subjected to the death penalty" was permissible. 23
Although North Carolina may be the only state that has expressly permit-
ted a prosecutor to consider the wishes of the victim's family in a potential capi-
tal case,24 the use of prosecutorial discretion has been widely recognized as
necessary.25 District attorneys are forced to balance limited prosecutorial re-
16. Id. at 121, 316 S.E.2d at 50. The defense argued that if Wilson had been allowed to plead
guilty to second degree murder, he would have been sentenced as a Class B Felon and would have
been eligible for early release or parole. Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 16.
17. Wilson, 311 N.C. at 122, 316 S.E.2d at 50. Defendant introduced evidence that during the
tenure of the then-present district attorney in Randolph County, in "eight out of nine cases where
the defendant had been charged with murder in the first degree (exclusive of defendant's case), the
defendant was subsequently allowed to plead guilty to a lesser-included offense or the defendant had
been tried on a lesser-included offense." Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 121, 316 S.E.2d at 50.
21. Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 19. The defense argued that this practice would "convert
a system of justice into a system of irrational retribution." Id.
22. Wilson, 311 N.C. at 124, 316 S.E.2d at 51; see also infra notes 29-33 and accompanying text
(requirements for the defense of discriminatory prosecution).
23. Wilson, 311 N.C. at 124, 316 S.E.2d at 51.
24. Capital punishment studies have recognized that prosecutors may be influenced by the vic-
tim's family. Bowers, The Pervasiveness of Arbitrariness and Discrimination Under Post-Furman
Capital Statutes, 74 . CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1967, 1976 (1983). Apparently, however, no other
courts have allowed consideration of the wishes of the victim's family.
25. See Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962); United States v. Brokaw, 60 F.Supp. 100, 102 (S.D.
Ill. 1945) (dictum that the discretion of the prosecutor derives from the common law); State v.
Spicer, 299 N.C. 309, 261 S.E.2d 893 (1980). In Spicer the court recognized that the charging func-
tion of the district attorney includes weighing "many factors such as 'the likelihood of a successful
prosecution, the social value of obtaining a conviction as against the time and expense to the State,
[Vol. 63
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sources against the likelihood of a conviction. 26 Moreover, because every case is
different and may not fit clearly into one statutory classification of a crime, the
prosecutor must decide which crime or crimes best fit the facts.27 Prosecutorial
discretion helps bridge the gap between textbook criminal prosecution and the
actual charging of criminals on a day-to-day basis.
If the prosecutor abuses his discretion, however, the accused may raise the
defense of "discriminatory prosecution," which usually is based on the four-
teenth amendment's guarantee of equal protection.28 North Carolina recognizes
this defense2 9 and follows the standards set by the United States Supreme Court
in Oyler v. Boles.30 In Oyler the Supreme Court ruled that a criminal prosecu-
tion "deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or
other arbitrary classification" violated the equal protection clause.31 The un-
equal application of the law must be purposeful or intentional; 32 mere unequal
effects on an individual only demonstrate that the prosecutor exercised his
discretion. 33
By approaching the abuse of prosecutorial discretion as a defense, courts
analyzing the prosecutor's decision to seek the death penalty ask only whether
certain unjustifiable standards such as race or religion were used. Thus, the
legally relevant factors a prosecutor may use to decide whether to charge a capi-
tal crime remain undefined. Although Wilson recognized one prosecutorial fac-
tor-the wishes of the victim's family-the North Carolina Supreme Court
expressly has avoided the task of establishing specific standards for when the
death penalty will be sought.3 4 The court, however, has stated that the general
and his own sense ofjustice in the particular case.'" Id. at 311, 261 S.E.2d at 895 (citing Comment,
The Right to Nondiscriminatory Enforcement of State Penal Laws, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1103, 1119
(1961)).
26. See Comment, The Right to Nondiscriminatory Enforcement of State Penal Laws, 61
COLUM. L. REv. 1103, 1119 (1961).
27. See Wilson, 311 N.C. at 124, 316 S.E.2d at 51.
28. U.S. CONsT. amend XIV, § 1.
29. State v. Lawson, 310 N.C. 632, 644, 314 S.E.2d 493, 500-01 (1984); State v. Cherry, 298
N.C. 86, 103, 257 S.E.2d 551, 562 (1979), cerL denied, 446 U.S. 941 (1980).
30. 368 U.S. 448 (1961). In Oyler defendant claimed that he was the only person prosecuted as
a habitual offender in Taylor County, West Virginia, from January 1940 to June 1955; five other
defendants in that period could have been prosecuted as habitual offenders. Id. at 455. Defendant
argued that the more severe penalty under the habitual offender statute was imposed only in a mi-
nority of cases and that this denied equal protection to those against whom the heavier penalty was
enforced. The Court held: "Even though the statistics in this case might imply a policy of selective
enforcement, it was not stated that the selection was deliberately based upon an unjustifiable stan-
dard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification. Therefore grounds supporting a finding
of denial of equal protection were not alleged." Id. at 454-56.
31. Id. at 456.
32. See State v. Spicer, 299 N.C. 309, 312, 261 S.E.2d 893, 896 (1980) (citing Oyler, 368 U.S. at
456, in which the Court said that "the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in
itself a federal constitutional violation."); State v. Cherry, 298 N.C. 86, 103, 257 S.E.2d 551, 562
(1979), cerL denied, 446 U.S. 941 (1980).
33. State v. Spicer, 299 N.C. 309, 312, 261 S.E.2d 893, 896 (1980). "A defendant must show
more than simply that discretion has been exercised in the application of a law resulting in unequal
treatment among individuals. He must show that in the exercise of that discretion there has been
intentional or deliberate discrimination by design." Id.
34. State v. Lawson, 310 N.C. 632, 644 n.2, 314 S.E.2d 493, 501 n.2 (1984).
1985] 1139
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
assembly could define prosecutorial considerations. 35 Unless the general assem-
bly acts, the prosecutor's charging function in capital punishment cases will con-
tinue on an ad hoc basis.
The danger in not prescribing legally relevant prosecutorial factors lies in
the possibility that not all arbitrary or capricious charging decisions will be
checked by the defense of discriminatory prosecution. Some unfair criteria may
not rise to the level required for a defense based on prosecutorial abuse, and
other discrimination may not be subject to proof.36 Capital punishment studies
are split on whether discrimination based on socio- economic and racial grounds
occurs in prosecutions despite post-Furman protections. 37 Most studies, how-
ever, recognize that prosecutors consider such non-legal factors as a judge's rep-
utation for imposing capital punishment, pressure from police and media, and
public reaction to the crime. 38 Legally relevant considerations generally include
35. Id. ("If prosecutors are to be 'guided' in the exercise of this kind of discretion, we think it is
the province of the legislature and not this Court to so provide.").
36. North Carolina currently recognizes race, religion, or other arbitrary classification as unjus-
tifiable standards for imposing the death penalty. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
Allowing the victim's family to help decide whether to pursue capital punishment also may be an
unfair or arbitrary standard; however, the North Carolina Supreme Court held in Wilson that this
procedure is not sufficiently unjustifiable to be considered discriminatory prosecution. Wilson, 311
N.C. at 124, 316 S.E.2d at 51. Considerations such as the prosecutor's inclination towards capital
punishment or the scheduled judge's reputation also may not rise to the level of discriminatory
prosecution.
Even the use of clearly unjustifiable standards such as race or religion will be difficult to prove.
With an unlimited number of factors on which a district attorney can base his decision to prosecute,
any unjustifiable standards can be masked by allowable standards.
37. Bowers, supra note 24, at 1071-78. This study, conducted in Florida during 1976-77, found
a 19 percent greater chance of a first degree murder indictment when a black killed a white than
when a black killed a black. The study also found a 17 percent difference between first degree
indictments of defendants with court appointed attorneys as compared with defendants who retained
private attorneys. Id.
A study of all homicides in South Carolina between June 1977 and November 1979 in which the
death penalty could have been sought found that "[w]hile prosecutors sought the death penalty
nearly four times as often for blacks accused of killing whites as they did when blacks were accused
of killing other blacks, they were only twice as likely to seek the death sentence when white defend-
ants had white rather than black victims." Jacoby & Paternoster, Sentencing Disparity and Jury
Packing: Further Challenges To the Death Penalty, 73 J. CiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 379, 384-85
(1982); see also Paternoster, Race of Victim and Location of Crime: The Decision to Seek the Death
Penalty in South Carolina, 74 J. CRM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 754 (1983) (disparity between rural and
urban death penalty charges).
Other studies have not found conclusive evidence of discrimination in death penalty convic-
tions. Redelet, Racial Characteristics and the Impostion of the Death Penalty, 46 AM. Soc. REv.
918, 922-23 (1981). This study was cited in Paternoster, supra ("Radelet found that murderers of
whites were significantly more likely to be indicted for first-degree murder than were killers of
blacks. . . . Radelet, however, found no evidence of discrimination by race of offender once the
victim's race was controlled."); see also Note, Discrimination and Arbitrariness in Capital Punish-
ment: An Analysis of Post-Furman Murder Cases in Dade County, Florida, 1973-1976, 33 STAN. L.
REv. 75, 76 (1980) ("Although sentences were the most severe in cases where blacks killed whites,
there is no conclusive evidence of racial discrimination after taking into account the differences
between felony murders and nonfelony killings.").
38. Bowers, supra note 24, at 1076. Interviews with judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys
revealed the following nonlegal influences on the prosecutor's decision to bring a capital charge:
1) Personal orientations or values of prosecutors which include aggressiveness of the prosecutor
and his orientation towards punishment (deterrence, retribution).
2) Situational pressures or constraints in handling cases which include plea bargaining strategy,
judge's reputation, and pressure from police.
[Vol. 631140
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the facts of the case, the sufficiency and quality of the evidence, and any aggra-
vating and mitigating circumstances that relate to the crime and the defend-
ant.39 Not establishing objective guidelines and allowing such a wide range of
factors makes it possible for the prosecutor to discriminate based on his personal
motivations rather than analyzing possible charges in terms of the circumstances
of the crime.
Removing discrimination, regardless of its source, from capital punishment
was a primary consideration for the Furman Court. Although the per curiam
opinion held only that the imposition of the death penalty in that case consti-
tuted cruel and unusual punishment,4° six justices noted that unbridled discre-
tion in capital proceedings could have discriminatory effects. 4 1 Justice Stewart
objected to administering the death penalty in a "wanton" and "freakish" man-
ner.42 Referring to the cruel and unusual clause of the eighth amendment, Jus-
tice Douglas noted: "It would seem to be incontestable that the death penalty
inflicted on one defendant is 'unusual' if it discriminates against him by reason of
his race, religion, wealth, social position, or class, or if it is imposed under a
procedure that gives room for the play of such prejudices." 4 3
To reduce the risk that the death penalty would be imposed in a discrimina-
tory or capricious manner, capital statutes were rewritten to provide procedural
safeguards at the sentencing phase of the trial.44 The primary protection is the
requirement that juries find at least one statutory aggravating circumstance
before imposing the death penalty.4 5 The Supreme Court in Gregg approved the
changes made by the Georgia legislature in the Georgia capital punishment stat-
3) Social influences or pressures from community which include media coverage and public
opinion. Id. (excerpt from Table 2).
The general use of prosecutorial discretion is analyzed in Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the
Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 UCLA L. RxV. 1 (1971). Abrams classified those
prosecutorial factors that are applicable to all offenses in varying degrees as "practical factors."
Practical factors "include the prosecutor's belief in the guilt of a suspect, the likelihood of a convic-
tion, the possibility of obtaining the suspect's cooperation in other matters, the prosecutor's concern
about his record for obtaining convictions, the influence of the law enforcement agents involved, and
the general character of the offender." Id. at 11.
39. Bowers, supra note 24, at 1076.
40. Furman, 408 U.S. at 239-40 (per curiam) (opinion quoted supra note 4).
41. See supra note 10.
42. Furman, 408 U.S. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
43. Id. at 242 (Douglas, J., concurring).
44. See Note, Discretion and the Constitutionality of the New Death Penalty Statutes, 87 HARV.
L. REV. 1690 (1974).
45. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 197. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(c) (1977) complies with this
requirement:
(c) Findings in Support of Sentence of Death. When the jury recommends a sentence of
death, the foreman of the jury shall sign a writing on behalf of the jury which writing shall
show:
(1) The statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances which the jury finds
beyond a reasonable doubt; and
(2) That the statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances found by the jury
are sufficiently substantial to call for the imposition of the death penalty; and
(3) That the mitigating circumstance or circumstances are insufficient to outweigh the
aggravating circumstance or circumstances found.
1985]
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ute and held that the statute was constitutional.4 6 The Georgia statute, how-
ever, did not restrict the prosecutor's discretion in deciding who would be
subject to the death penalty.
Addressing the issue of discretion in Gregg, the Court concluded that only
sentencing procedures were required to protect against arbitrary use of capital
punishment.47 The Court distinguished prosecutorial discretion that could only
have a mercy-granting effect by removing a defendant from consideration for the
death penalty from unbridled jury discretion that could result in selective impo-
sition of the death penalty on those already convicted of a capital offense.48
Moreover, the Court felt that removing prosecutorial discretion would be
equivalent to creating a mandatory charging system that would require a capital
prosecution whenever evidence existed that a suspect had committed a capital
murder.4 9 Such a system, the Court noted, would force the prosecutor to distin-
guish between murderers solely on the basis of legislative classifications of
crimes,50 a requirement very similar to the mandatory death penalty statutes
held unconstitutional in Woodson v. North Carolina.5 1
Notwithstanding Gregg, unbridled prosecutorial discretion subsequently
has been challenged as allowing discriminatory imposition of the death penalty.
The North Carolina Supreme Court, relying on Gregg, rejected this challenge in
State v. Lawson.5 2 Gregg, however, provides weak support for unrestricted
prosecutorial discretion; it is stronger support for requiring prosecutorial discre-
tion but restricting it solely to a consideration of legally relevant factors. First,
the contention that prosecutorial discretion can only grant mercy,5 3 and thus
benefit a defendant, is suspect. Applied in the extreme, an offer to plea bargain
could be made to all capital defendants except a select few the prosecutor feels
46. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 207.
Gregg established three essential components for a capital punishment statute:
1. The trial must have separate guilt and sentencing stages. "No longer can a Georgia jury do as
Furman's jury did: reach a finding of the defendant's guilt and then, without guidance or direction,
decide whether he should live or die." Id. at 197.
2. The jury must weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances of the crime and "must find a
statutory aggravating circumstance before recommending a sentence of death." Id.
3. The statute must provide for an automatic appeal of all death sentences. Id. at 198. See also
Survey of Developments in North Carolina Law, 55 N.C.L. REV. 895, 973-74 (summary of the Gregg
capital punishment statute requirements).
47. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 199 ("Furman held only that, in order to minimize the risk that the
death penalty would be imposed on a capriciously selected group of offenders, the decision to impose
it had to be guided by standards so that the sentencing authority would focus on the particularized
circumstances of the crime and the defendant.") (emphasis added).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 199 n.50.
50. Id. The Gregg Court suggested in a footnote that without prosecutorial discretion in charg-
ing death-penalty crimes, the procedure "in many respects would have the vices of the mandatory
death penalty statutes we hold unconstitutional today in Woodson v. North Carolina and Roberts v.
Louisiana." Id. (citations omitted). The Court in Woodson objected to legislative classifications of
capital crimes which, if mandatory, would have unduly harsh results. Woodson, 428 U.S. 280, 293
(1975).
51. 428 U.S. 280 0976) (North Carolina capital punishment statute requiring the death penalty
in all cases of first-degree murder held unconstitutional).
52. 310 N.C. 632, 644, 314 S.E.2d 493, 501 (1984).
53. See supra text accompanying note 48.
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deserve the death penalty. Using discretion in this manner is a "wanton" and
"freakish" imposition of the death penalty.
Second, if prosecutorial discretion is constitutionally required to avoid the
Woodson-type mandatory prosecution,5 4 this result still can be achieved if the
prosecutor only considers legally relevant factors. Consideration of the aggra-
vating and mitigating circumstances of the crime would help avoid overly rigid
compliance with legislative crime classifications.
Last, the three-justice concurring opinion in Gregg55 indicated that the
Supreme Court was not considering the possibility of abuse by prosecutors. Jus-
tice White assumed prosecutors would use legally relevant factors; 56 he con-
tended that defendants would escape the death penalty through prosecutorial
charging decisions only if the offense was not serious enough, or the proof was
not strong enough.5 7 The concurring opinion therefore shows that Gregg is not
support for a prosecutor's reliance on nonlegal considerations.
If Gregg allows the use of prosecutorial discretion but limits it to legally
relevant considerations, the scope of allowable factors should be defined. Under
Furman a decision to impose the death penalty should focus on the circum-
stances of the crime and the defendant.58 Justice White stated in Gregg that the
prosecutor should use the same criteria that the jury uses to decide whether to
impose the death penalty.5 9 Under capital punishment statutes consistent with
Gregg, the jury is limited to weighing the aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances of the crime.60 Use of this standard in the decision to prosecute would
exclude nonlegal considerations such as the personal motivation of the prosecu-
tor or the wishes of the victim's family.
Limiting prosecutorial discretion to the circumstances of the crime and the
defendant also is supported by Justice Douglas' remarks in Gregg that the death
penalty cannot be imposed under a procedure that "gives room for the play of
such prejudices" as race, religion, or social position. 61 Because a request for
capital prosecution by the victim's family could stem from long-harbored resent-
ment towards a particular segment of the community, consulting the family per-
mits these prejudices to surface. Conversely, consideration only of the
circumstances of the crime and the defendant would preclude such prejudices
from affecting the outcome of the case.62
54. See supra text accompanying notes 49-51.
55. 428 U.S. at 207 (White, J., concurring) (joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Rehnquist).
56. Id. at 225 (White, J., concurring). Justice White's proposition is quoted supra text accom-
panying note 11. White noted: "Absent facts to the contrary," prosecutors are presumed to use
legally relevant criteria. Id. (White, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Perhaps Justice White sug-
gested that facts indicating a prosecutor's use of nonlegal criteria would result in arbitrary imposi-
tion of the death penalty in violation of the eighth amendment.
57. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 225 (White, J., concurring).
58. See supra note 47.
59. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 225 (White, J., concurring).
60. See supra note 46.
61. Furman, 408 U.S. at 242 (Douglas, J., concurring).
62. Prejudicial and arbitrary prosecution can surface in many forms. Public or media pressure
stemming from a widely publicized murder may tilt a district attorney's decision in favor of capital
1985] 1143
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Limiting the prosecutor's charging function to an analysis of the circum-
stances of the crime and the defendant also creates a procedural advantage. Any
indication of discriminatory prosecution is likely to result in an appeal. The
state appellate courts then must decide whether the prosecutor relied on proper
grounds in charging a capital offense. Appeals taken by capital defendants can
be as numerous as the reasons for a prosecutor to seek the death penalty.6 3 Ap-
peals based on the prosecutor's use of nonlegal consideration, however, can be
avoided. Since the jury will find a defendant guilty of a capital offense only if
sufficient evidence of guilt exists and will impose the death penalty only if suffi-
cient aggravating circumstances exist, the prosecutor can prevent these appeals
by basing his decision to seek capital punishment on only those considerations
available to the jury. Because legally relevant factors are available to the prose-
cutor, he need not resort to nonlegal considerations. Limiting the prosecutor to
a consideration of the circumstances of the crime and the defendant therefore
would reduce the grounds for procedural appeals.
Despite Furman's nondiscrimination objectives, unbridled prosecutorial
discretion permits arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty.
Even in a nondiscriminatory context, procedural appeals will result when the
prosecutor unnecessarily strays from legally relevant considerations in deciding
whether to charge a capital offense. These problems can be resolved by a minor
change in North Carolina's capital punishment statute. The existing statute lists
the aggravating and mitigating circumstances the jury may use in imposing the
death penalty. 64 These circumstances focus on the crime and the defendant, and
prosecution. In this situation the defendant's charge would not be based on legally relevant consid-
erations; rather, it would result from public demand for anticrime action. Restricting prosecutorial
discretion to the circumstances of the crime and the defendant would limit the prejudicial effects of a
defendant's notoriety.
63. See supra note 38 (nonlegal prosecutorial considerations).
64. The North Carolina statute states:
(e) Aggravating Circumstances.-Aggravating circumstances which may be considered
shall be limited to the following:
(1) The capital felony was committed by a person lawfully incarcerated.
(2) The defendant had been previously convicted of another capital felony.
(3) The defendant had been previously convicted of a felony involving the use or
threat of violence to the person.
(4) The capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a
lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody.
(5) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged, or was an
aider or abettor, in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing
or attempting to commit, any homicide, robbery, rape or a sex offense, arson, burglary,
kidnapping, or aircraft piracy or the unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a de-
structive device or bomb.
(6) The capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain.
(7) The capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of any
governmental function or the enforcement of laws.
(8) The capital felony was committed against a law-enforcement officer, employee of
the Department of Correction, jailer, fireman, judge or justice, former judge or justice,
prosecutor or former prosecutor, juror or former juror, or witness or former witness
against the defendant, while engaged in the performance of his official duties or because of
the exercise of his official duty.
(9) The capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.
(10) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person
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determine the egregiousness of the murder. Additionally, the North Carolina
Constitution and General Statutes specify which crimes are capital;65 the jury
considers evidence that proves whether a capital crime was committed by the
defendant. The general assembly and the courts have approved the jury's use of
these factors in deciding whether a defendant committed the crime and whether
a death sentence should be imposed. The prosecutor, like the jury, should be
limited to considering these legally relevant factors in deciding whom to prose-
cute for a death-punishable crime.
PETER K. DANIEL
by means of a weapon or device which would normally be hazardous to the lives of more
than one person.
(11) The murder for which the defendant stands convicted was part of a course of
conduct in which the defendant engaged and which included the commission by the de-
fendant of other crimes of violence against another person or persons.
(f) Mitigating Circumstances.-Mitigating circumstances which may be considered shall
include, but not be limited to, the following:
(1) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity.
(2) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of
mental or emotional disturbance.
(3) The victim was a voluntary participant in the defendant's homicidal conduct or
consented to the homicidal act.
(4) The defendant was an accomplice in or accessory to the capital felony committed
by another person and his participation was relatively minor.
(5) The defendant acted under duress or under the domination of another person.
(6) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law was impaired.
(7) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.
(8) The defendant aided in the apprehension of another capital felon or testified truth-
fully on behalf of the prosecution in another prosecution of a felony.
(9) Any other circumstance arising from the evidence which the jury deems to have
mitigating value.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e)-(f) (1977).
65. N.C. CONST. art. XI, § 2 (murder, arson, burglary, and rape punishable by death if the
general assembly shall so enact); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (1981) (murder in the first degree in-
cludes those murders committed in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of any arson, rape or
sex offense, robbery, kidnapping, burglary, or other felony committed or attempted with the use of a
deadly weapon; first degree murder punishable by death).
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